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Introduction
Until 1992, trade restrictions, market price support, and supply management policies were the major instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A process of 'decoupling' was initiated with the MacSharry reform to mitigate the weaknesses of this policy conception.
After 1992, direct aids were granted to producers of arable crops, beef and veal, sheep meat and goat meat as a compensation for lower administrative prices. In the Agenda 2000 reform, this process continued by including the milk sector and by establishing the program for rural development (the "second pillar" of the CAP). Theoretically, fully decoupled payments are considered to have minimal or no allocative effects at all and hence are classified as almost pure income support. Although it is not fully clear whether DDPs as established by the CAP are fully decoupled (OECD, 2006a and b) , it is beyond doubt that this process has increased the degree of decoupling of agricultural support in the EU.
For a long time, agricultural economists (e.g. Koester and Tangermann, 1976) have considered the introduction of decoupled direct payments as an important step to mitigate the negative effects of market price support, high consumer prices and excess supply. They were also seen as a better alternative to reaching the farm income goals of the CAP and to avoid the • The income indicator of the farm accountancy data network (FADN) -'farm family income' -is tricky to interpret, because many agricultural holdings are organized as companies. In addition, the sample of farms providing the information is considered to not to be representative.
• The economic accounts for agriculture (EAA) is a satellite account of the national accounts. Its main indicators are 'factor income' and 'net entrepreneurial income'. Besides the fact that the quality of data supplied by some member states seems to be poor, these indicators are only provided at sector level. Distributional comparisons can therefore only be made across countries or with other sectors, but not among farm holdings within the farming sector of a country.
• The same is true for statistics on the income of the agricultural households sectors (IAHS; see Eurostat, 2002 
Previous studies
Over the last years, the OECD (1999 OECD ( , 2003 has repeatedly looked at the various dimensions of the distribution of agricultural incomes. The OECD (1999) analyses the distributional effects of agricultural policies in the mid-90s using its own structural data and support estimates. In detail, the report compares the distribution of support in relation to output and income in OECD countries. The report concludes that the distribution of market price support is very similar to the one of output. Differences in output, support, and income across regions are less than those across farm types or size classes. Moreover, distributions of output, support, and income in the countries reviewed have shown little change over the last ten years. Kurashige and Hwan Cho (2001) examine the incidence of low income as well as the impact of social security policies of OECD countries in agriculture. Farm households are delineated according to farm self-employment income, "low farm income" is defined as a certain fraction of a national median income. Based on six indicators, the degree of low income and inequality in income distribution, both for farm households and non-farm households, is scrutinized. Key results are that "low income" is higher among farm households than among non-farm households and that the income distribution shows a higher degree of inequality in farm households than in non-farm households, despite the fact that in many countries the farm sector receives significant benefits from the social security system.
Allanson (2003) Cross compliance schemes and the special beef premium had a more moderate effect in terms of equity and arable aid payments contributed least to farm income equity
The territorial dimension of CAP expenditures has been analyzed by Shucksmith et al. (2005) .
Looking at the regional distribution of CAP payments and their contribution to cohesion objectives, the authors found that CAP payments do not support territorial cohesion, because more prosperous regions get higher levels of CAP transfers. Table 1 Aggregated data on the distribution of direct payments across EU member states have been published regularly since they were introduced and can therefore be set in relation to other variables of interest like the number of farms or persons engaged in farming like in Table 1 .
But the recipients of direct payments are only a subgroup of beneficiaries of CAP measures.
Detailed data on the distribution of direct payments and the number of recipients were 
The distribution of direct payments within EU member states
How direct payments are distributed among recipients can be shown in several ways.
EUROSTAT publishes the number of recipients and the volume of transfers aggregated in 12
classes. Comparing the holdings getting less than 5,000 Euros with those getting more can be The ratio between mean and median of payments is another indicator of an unequal distribution. Using the method described in Bleymüller et al., (1991, pp15) , the median payments per Member State were calculated (Table 2) . In some countries, the ratio between mean and median is relatively large, e.g. in the Czech Republic (7.48), Slovakia (8.09), and Spain (4.09), indicating that the distribution is skewed. In some member states, more than 90
Exploring the Distribution of Direct Payments of CAP -9 -per cent of holdings received less than EUR 1,250 (e.g. Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Poland, and Slovenia). In these countries medians and the means are very close. Table 2 Another measure of (in)equality is the concentration ratio (CR). It has the same interpretation as the Gini-Coefficient, but it is calculated in a slightly different way (see Appendix). CRs can range from zero indicating absolute equality (all holdings get proportionally the same amount of direct payments) to one showing absolute inequality (one holding gets all direct payments). Percentages of CRs for the year 2000 and 2006 are presented in Table 2 .
The ranking of CRs shows that the concentration of direct payments was relatively low in Lorenz curves are a graphical presentation of inequality (Lorenz, 1905) . Based on the data on direct payments to holdings, estimates of parameters were made that can be used to construct
Lorenz curves (see Appendix). The Gini-coefficients -a measure closely related to the CRis the equivalent of the area between the diagonal of a Lorenz graph (showing equality) and a Lorenz curve of an observed distribution (Gini, 1921) . Therefore, CR (or Gini-coefficients) and Lorenz curves are very similar measures. While Lorenz curves allow an ordinal ranking of different distributions owing to a visual impression over a wide range of payments, CRs show relative (in)equality in a single figure. An in-depth discussion on Lorenz curves and measures of inequality is provided in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) .
For demonstration purposes, Lorenz curves of direct payments in the EU, Denmark and
France are presented in Figure 3 based on the parameter estimates in Table A1 . As the literature survey and the data published by EUROSTAT showed, the opposite is true for recipients of direct payments of the CAP. • Market policy instruments have not been abandoned, but have been scaled back to lower levels of market intervention. Buckwell et al. (1997) suggested that in the longer run direct payments should become a social policy instrument while the program for rural development should become the policy instrument for improving competitiveness and financing public environmental goods. This opens the question whether the EU or the member states should be the primary sources of financing these tasks.
The distribution of direct payments within EU member states and between them is the consequence of agricultural structures and historical developments, in particular the process of integration. CAP payments, among them direct payments, are not motivated by distributive considerations alone. Currently they are justified to ease the process of integration for the agricultural community of member states that have recently entered the EU. Another purpose Exploring the Distribution of Direct Payments of CAP -13 -is to facilitate structural adjustment of farms that are exposed to freer market conditions after decades of CAP interventions in the EU-15 member states. Given that direct payments are only granted if standards of good agricultural and environmental conditions ("cross compliance") are met, they have an environmental facet as well.
The principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson, 1969) gives guidance for the question regarding which of the issues currently addressed by direct payments should be financed at EU level or at the level of member states: Beneficiaries of the Member State should finance the provision of public goods of national interest and the EU should finance those of interest for the EU in an appropriate way.
Cross compliance is implementing standards that are not uniform across the EU, but depends on national and sometimes sub-national conditions. Given that most aspects covered by crosscompliance regulations are concerning local public goods, it seems more justified that member states and not the EU should be responsible. Another argument is that property rights on environmental goods are distributed differently across the member states. This would allow keeping windfall profits at a minimum because currently it seems very unlikely that the per hectare premiums reflect social opportunity costs.
To ensure "a fair standard of living for the agricultural community" is one of the objectives of the CAP. This is definitely a distributive goal. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say something substantial about whether this objective has been reached or not. Statistics on the distribution of household incomes of the agricultural community relative to other communities do not exist for the EU. Given that social equity is generally an agenda of member states, it seems justified to hand over the competence in this field to them. The responsibility of the EU should be to establish the criteria and to control that member states abide by them as is the case in many other fields of policy.
The Lorenz curve relates the cumulative proportion of direct payment units (farms), x, to the cumulative proportion of direct payment received, y, when units are arranged in ascending order of their direct payments. The data of EUROSTAT provide twelve classes of farms (x) and direct payments received (y), of which cumulative proportions are calculated (farms receiving negative transfers were excluded in the estimates). We use the functional form proposed by Rasche et al. (1980) to estimate Lorenz curves. The explicit functional form is:
(1) ( ) 
The function possesses the proper convexity and slope constraints to assure that it always lies in the lower triangle of the unit square (Rasche et al., 1980) . Source: see Table 1 . Source: Own estimates.
